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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
BRETT THOMAS SOUTHWICK,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 48530-2020
Cassia County Case No.
CR16-18-200

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Has Brett Thomas Southwick failed to show that the district court abused its discretion
when it revoked his probation and executed the underlying sentences?
ARGUMENT
Southwick Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion
A.

Introduction
The state charged Southwick with second degree kidnapping, injury to children, and

domestic battery in the presence of a child. (R., pp.27-29.) Pursuant to a plea agreement,
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Southwick entered Alford 1 guilty pleas to felony domestic battery and felony injury to a child.
(R., pp.71-78.) The court imposed consecutive sentences of six years, with one and one-half years
determinate, and retained jurisdiction.

(R., pp.82-84.)

Following the period of retained

jurisdiction, the court suspended Southwick’s sentences and placed him on probation for three
years. (R., pp.92-96.)
Approximately one year after being placed on probation, Southwick admitted to violating
the terms of his probation by failing to report to probation and by failing to report for scheduled
drug tests. (R., pp.97-105, 119.) The district court continued Southwick’s probation with some
additional terms. (R., pp.124-26.) About two months later, Southwick admitted to violating his
probation by testing positive for amphetamine, methamphetamine, and opioids, and by failing to
report for required drug testing. (R., pp.130-36; 10/26/20 Tr., p.8, L.24 – p.10, L.24.)
During the disposition hearing, Southwick requested a second period of retained
jurisdiction, or alternatively for his sentences to run concurrently rather than consecutively.
(11/23/20 Tr., p.6, L.17 – p.8, L.2.) The district court revoked Southwick’s probation and executed
the underlying sentences without modification. (R., pp.161-63; 11/23/20 Tr., p.11, Ls.18-20.)
Southwick timely appealed. (R., pp.170-72.) On appeal, Southwick asserts the district
court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation and imposed the underlying sentences
without amending them to r concurrently. (Appellant’s brief, pp.4-8.) Review of the record and
proper application of the relevant legal standards shows no abuse of discretion.
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North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
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B.

Standard Of Review
The Court “review[s] a district court’s decision to revoke probation under an abuse of

discretion standard.” State v. Knutsen, 138 Idaho 918, 923, 71 P.3d 1065, 1070 (Ct. App. 2003)
(citation omitted). Likewise, the Court reviews the district court’s decision not to reduce a
sentence upon revoking probation under an abuse of discretion standard. See State v. Cornelison,
154 Idaho 793, 799, 302 P.3d 1066, 1072 (Ct. App. 2013) (applying abuse of discretion standard
to a challenge to the district court’s order declining to commute defendant’s sentence to county
jail time with work release). The Court “reviews an alleged abuse of discretion by determining
whether the trial court (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the
outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the
specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason.” State v.
Smith, 168 Idaho 463, ___, 483 P.3d 149, 1006, 1019 (2021) (internal quotation omitted).
C.

Southwick Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion
It is within the trial court’s discretion to revoke probation if the probationer violates any

term or condition of the probation. Idaho Code §§ 19-2603, 20-222; State v. Beckett, 122 Idaho
324, 325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992). “Review of a probation revocation proceeding
involves a two-step analysis.” State v. Garner, 161 Idaho 708, 710, 390 P.3d 434, 436 (2017)
(citations omitted). First, the Court determines “whether the defendant violated the terms of his
probation.” State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105, 233 P.3d 33, 36 (2009) (citation omitted). If
the Court determines “that the defendant has in fact violated the terms of his probation, the second
question is what should be the consequences of that violation.” Id.
On appeal, Southwick does not challenge his admissions to violating the terms of
probation, nor does he appear to dispute the district court’s decision to revoke his probation.
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(Appellant’s brief, pp.4-8.) Rather, he challenges the district court’s decision to execute his
underlying sentences without modifying them to run concurrently. (Id.) The district court did not
abuse its discretion by revoking Southwick’s probation without reducing or otherwise modifying
the underlying sentences.
1.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Revoked Southwick’s
Probation

“The purpose of probation is to give the defendant an opportunity to be rehabilitated under
proper control and supervision” while also providing adequate protection for society. State v.
Mummert, 98 Idaho 452, 454, 566 P.2d 1110, 1112 (1977); State v. Kerr, 115 Idaho 725, 726, 769
P.2d 602, 603 (Ct. App. 1989). “If the trial judge reasonably concludes from the defendant’s
conduct that probation is not achieving its rehabilitative purpose, probation may be revoked.”
State v. Peterson, 123 Idaho 49, 50-51, 844 P.2d 31, 32-33 (Ct. App. 1992) (citation omitted).
Probation is not meeting the objective of rehabilitation and is not providing adequate protection
for society where the probationer repeatedly violates the conditions of his or her probation and
uses proscribed substances. See, e.g., Cornelison, 154 Idaho at 798-99, 302 P.3d at 1071-72
(affirming probation revocation as probation was not serving the goal of rehabilitation due to
defendant’s use of alcohol and marijuana and failure to report); State v. Hass, 114 Idaho 554, 558,
758 P.2d 713, 717 (Ct. App. 1988) (holding the district court properly revoked probation because
“this was the third violation of probation” and the defendant “had continued to engage in
counterproductive acts” like possessing marijuana).
In this case, Southwick repeatedly violated the terms of his probation, thereby
demonstrating that his probation was not achieving its rehabilitative purpose or providing adequate
protection for society. Southwick successfully completed the rider programming and earned a
recommendation from the Department of Correction for supervised probation. (PSI, pp.66-73.)
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The district court obliged and placed Southwick on probation following the period of retained
jurisdiction. (R., pp.92-96.) However, Southwick violated the terms of his probation within the
first year of his community supervision by failing to report to probation and by failing to report
for multiple scheduled drug tests. (R., p.97-105, 119.) Notwithstanding the violations, the district
court gave him a second chance to succeed in the community by continuing his probation. (R.,
pp.124-26.) Despite having the benefit of the rider programming and being given a second
opportunity to succeed on probation, Southwick continued to demonstrate that probation was not
fruitful. He used illicit substances and continued to skip his scheduled drug tests. (R., pp.130-36;
10/26/20 Tr., p.8, L.24 – p.10, L.24.)
During the disposition hearing, the district court expressly considered whether Southwick’s
probation was achieving its intended rehabilitative purpose and was consistent with the protection
of society. (11/23/20 Tr., p.9, L.23 – p.10, L.18.) Given the fact that Southwick’s repeated
probation violations related primarily to his “substance abuse issues” (i.e., continued drug use and
evasion of mandatory drug testing), the district reasonably determined that probation was not
achieving its intended rehabilitative goal and that he was no longer “a viable candidate for
probation.” (11/23/20 Tr., p.10, Ls.5-7; p.11, Ls.9-10.) Because Southwick’s repeated probation
violations demonstrated that probation was not achieving its rehabilitative purpose or providing
adequate protection for society, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it revoked his
probation. Southwick has failed to argue, much less show, otherwise.
2.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Denied Southwick’s
Request To Run The Underlying Sentences Concurrently

Upon revoking probation, the district court may “order that the suspended sentence be
executed or, in the alternative, the court is authorized under Idaho Criminal Rule 35 to reduce the
sentence.” State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618, 622, 288 P.3d 835, 839 (Ct. App. 2012). In reviewing
5

a sentence reinstated after probation has been revoked, the Court applies “the same criteria to
examine a decision made upon a request for sentence reduction as those applied in determining
whether the original sentence was reasonable.” State v. Martin, 122 Idaho 423, 425, 835 P.2d 658,
660 (Ct. App. 1992); -see --also ---------State v. Bailey, 161 Idaho 887, 895-96, 392 P.3d 1228, 1236-37
(2017) (reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence involves considering the goals of protecting
society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution).
For instance, in Adams the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision to
execute of the defendant’s original sentence without modification upon probation revocation.
State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1056, 772 P.2d 260, 263 (Ct. App. 1989). In that case, the
defendant violated his probation by making profane statements to a custodial officer. Id. at 1055,
722 P.2d at 262. The district court considered the ramifications of executing the original sentence
upon revoking probation and gave the defendant credit for all time served in jail. Id. at 1056, 722
P.2d at 263. The district court noted that with less than one year to serve until completion of the
minimum period of confinement, the defendant could “obtain parole relatively soon, depending on
his behavior in prison.” Id. In light of the sentencing criteria, the defendant’s criminal history,
the underlying criminal conduct, and the probation violations, the Court of Appeals concluded that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to reduce the sentence. Id.
In this case, like in Adams, the district court properly revoked probation without reducing
or otherwise modifying Southwick’s sentence. Like the district court in Adams, the district court
here “considered modifying the original sentence[s].” (11/23/20 Tr., p.11, Ls.20-21.) However,
the court was concerned by the “severity of the underlying case.” (11/23/20 Tr., p.9, L.23 – p.10,
L.1; p.11, Ls.20-24.) Southwick bit, slapped, and punched the mother of his one-month-old twins
and then drove away dangerously fast with the twins and their mother in the car. (PSI, pp.6-7.)
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The victim tried to remove the keys from the ignition in an attempt to stop Southwick’s reckless
driving. (PSI, p.7.) Southwick became enraged and took her cell phone, would not let her leave
the car, and threatened to kill her and the twins if she ever “pull[ed] another stunt like that.” (Id.)
In determining whether to modify the underlying sentences, the district court also
considered the fact that Southwick’s multiple violations, which demonstrated that probation was
not meeting the sentencing objectives of protecting society and rehabilitation. (11/23/20 Tr., p.9,
L.24 – p.10, L.18.) The court concluded that it could not “overlook the severity of the underlying
crime” or “the fact that there [had] been multiple violations since [Southwick was] placed on
probation.” (11/23/20 Tr., p.12, Ls.10-12.) Accordingly, the district court found “the original
sentence to be appropriate,” revoked Southwick’s probation without modification, and credited
him with all time served, just like the district court in Adams, 115 Idaho at 1055, 772 P.2d at 262.
(11/23/20 Tr., p.11, L.18 – p.12, L.1.) Because the district court reasonably concluded that the
original sentence was appropriate in light of the relevant sentencing criteria, the nature of the
underlying criminal conduct, and Southwick’s repeated probation violations, it did not abuse its
discretion in declining to modify the underlying sentence upon revoking Southwick’s probation.
Southwick argues that mitigating factors such as his difficult upbringing; ongoing
substance abuse and mental health issues; and his attempts to “turn his life around” by obtaining a
GED, enrolling in college classes, and successfully completing a rider, show an abuse of
discretion. (Appellant’s brief, pp.4-8.) His argument is unavailing.
The district court’s conclusion that the original sentence was appropriate is well-founded.
Aside from his successful completion of the rider, all of the mitigating information relied on by
Southwick was before the district court at the time of sentencing. (See generally, PSI.) Thus, the
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court had already considered the appropriate amount of weight to afford to such information when
it originally imposed Southwick’s sentence.
Additionally, the district court did not ignore Southwick’s ongoing substance abuse. In
fact, before executing the original sentence the court considered placing Southwick on an
additional period of retained jurisdiction in order to place “additional focus on [his] substance
abuse.” (11/23/21 Tr., p.11, Ls.12-17.) However, the court sensibly concluded that the severity
of the charged conduct outweighed any need to provide additional substance abuse treatment in
the community beyond what had already been provided. (Id.)
Finally, although Southwick’s success during the rider is commendable, he squandered two
subsequent opportunities to successfully complete probation. As explained above, the district
court rewarded Southwick for his successful completion of the rider programming by placing him
on probation. Given the opportunity to apply the knowledge he accrued on his rider to his
probation, he failed to successfully do so. His conduct as a probationer showed that he was not
rehabilitated and that he continued to pose an “undue risk” for future violations. (11/23/20 Tr.,
p.11, Ls.10-11.) Reducing his sentences by running them concurrently would essentially reward
Southwick for repeatedly violating the terms of his probation. Southwick has shown no abuse of
the district court’s discretion in declining to run his sentences concurrently.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 13th day of July, 2021.

/s/ Justin R. Porter
JUSTIN R. PORTER
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 13th day of July, 2021, served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt
File and Serve:
KILEY A. HEFFNER
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us
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/s/ Justin R. Porter
JUSTIN R. PORTER
Deputy Attorney General
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